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The purpose of the present writer is multiple. It is (a) to consider the core 
philosophy and politics underpinning the teaching of the humanities in the light of 
the ‘’right to conquest’’; (b) to sum up the key features of the struggle for epistemic 
decolonisation by the African intellectual icons; and (c) to identify the responsibility 
of a new generation of African scholars in giving meaning and relevance to such 
disciplines. Pursuant to these issues, the thesis advanced here is that due to the 
history of colonisation and the attendant epistemicide in Africa, there is an ethical 
and educational necessity to inscribe African epistemology and philosophy of 
education in the teaching and practice of the humanities. The implications for such 
inscription speak to the need to address epistemic injustice and cognitive 
dissonance suffered by African students in the learning of such disciplines. 
Methodologically, the paper does not look at a particular discipline but takes a 
broad generalisation about the humanities, based on desk-top resource material 
and reflexivity of the author’s positionality.
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Introduction
This paper will first look at the socio-historical context within which the disciplines of the 
humanities emerged and some of the key European figures who inaugurated epistemicide and 
its results. The second section focuses on the lessons emanating from the situation of the ‘’right 
of conquest’’ and how the disciplines shaped on the African continent. In light of this, the third 
section locates the African intellectual icons in their struggle to claim sovereignty of African 
scholarship under determinate conditions of post-coloniality. This struggle was informed by 
Western conceptions of reason which considered only certain people, specifically Europeans, as 
rational, and thus dehumanised large segments of subaltern populations by excluding them from 
having the capacity to reason.
The humanities in socio-historical perspective and the ruins of epistemicide
From the onset, it is important to point out that the progenitors of the disciplines we call the 
humanities were central in the process of Western rebirth and imperial expansion to the colonies. 
As they emerged within the context of scientific invention and discoveries, these disciplines were 
developed and employed to diagnose and, where possible, to prognose the social complexities 
and complications of Western societies arising out of attempts to adjust to and take advantage of 
the impact of technological advancements. The disciplines played a critical role in articulating the 
effects of social disruption and maladjustments, while also exploring solutions and revealing 
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opportunities (Lebakeng 2001). In keeping with the scientific mood of the time, the humanities 
jealously emulated the Newtonian, Cartesian model of science so as to gain credence and 
accreditation as scientific disciplines; hence, some including economics, sociology and 
anthropology, distinguished themselves from the arts and preferred the descriptor social 
sciences. They sought to use a “scientific” approach intending to approach the study of social life 
in an objective, rational, and systematic manner. 
The irony though is that it was precisely because of this claim to scientific status that 
European scholars – David Hume, Emmanuel Kant and Georg Hegel – made chronically 
inaccurate representations of and pronouncements on other regions of the world, especially 
Africa and the inhabitants of the continent. At the core of their representations and 
pronouncements was the rationality debate, which questioned whether Africans were able to 
reason. According to scholars such as Masolo, (1994) and Jimoh (2018), the concept of reason 
differentiates between civilised and the uncivilised beings and those who are logical and the 
mystical ones. At the root of this problem are ontological assumptions concerning our parity as 
human beings disguised as epistemological issues about what counts as knowledge (Mungwini 
2020). The logic was to invisibilise Africans by calling into question their humanity, to dispel 
African situated knowledges, discount the role of Africa and the Africans in world civilisational 
history and to deny Africa as a source of ideas but affirm it as a place for gathering raw data.
Flowing from such rubbishing and condemnation of things African was the idea that 
Western values, systems, structures should be superimposed on Africans and African ones 
should be erased, marginalised and destroyed depending on the nationalistic impulses and 
proclivities of the respective colonisers or imperialist powers. The ruins of the destruction of 
indigenous knowledge systems and processes have been covered extensively by many scholars 
(Ramose 1999; Ntuli 1999).
In the colonies such as countries in Africa, the disciplines assisted colonial administrators to 
understand, penetrate and control peoples of the colonies. Epistemologically and 
paradigmatically, they spawned an academic pandemic characterised by a captive and mimetic 
mind in the university in Africa. Although anthropology has received the worst strictures, all these 
disciplines were complicit in colonisation as bourgeois disciplines (Mafeje 1976). Even 
Christianity gave moral and ethical foundation to land dispossession and the enslavement (Prior 
1997). As such, colonisation manifested itself through land dispossession (which in South Africa 
was given theological backing by the Dutch Reformed Church), epistemicide and proselytization 
(Lephakga 2015). It is noteworthy that with the development of Western institutions of higher 
learning in continents such as Africa, education was moulded along the colonising models in 
structure, in culture and in substance. Hence even in Africa, although the conceptions precluded 
the reality of pre-Western African science, the humanities had pretensions to scientific 
disciplinarity – as well articulated by Ake (1972; 1973).
The main reason for this is that in Africa the ethically questionable ‘right of conquest’ had 
devastating consequences in a range of spheres including the epistemological, philosophical, 
social, economic, political and jurisprudential. This is because the history of conquest resulted in 
the conquest of history through negation, erasure, destruction and the annihilation of modes of 
life of Africans and their social institutions. This history matters because the contact between 
western imperialism and Africa did not augur well for the Africans from an inter-culturality 
viewpoint (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Zondi 2016). Despite the differential impact of French, Belgium 
and British rule, colonialism left an indelibly negative mark on Africa. In this respect, the 
Enlightenment delivered light to Europe, but fixed and framed the African continent as a region of 
complete savagery and intellectual darkness which represented a negative ‘Other’. In a nutshell, 
it negated the humanity of Africans as historical, social, political and philosophical beings despite 
the fact that science, philosophy, rationality and thought are human activities over which the 
West does not have an exclusive monopoly.
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Western conceptions of reason considered only certain people, specifically Europeans, as 
rational, and thus dehumanised large segments of subaltern populations via excluding them from 
having the capacity to reason. In his ‘Critique of Black Reason’ (2017), Mbembe thus argues that 
colonial discourse was based on an ontology of ‘absolute alterity’, that allowed Europeans to 
position themselves at the apex of civilisation, democracy, and reason and with colonised 
peoples viewed as inferior, lacking, absent, and non-human – an ideology that was used 
retrospectively to justify their violent colonial adventures.
Given the diversity among the colonial powers, they left a wide range of legacies, all 
negative. The causal significance of legacies varies, in that they affect subsequent freedom of 
manoeuvre, to different extents and in different directions. At its strongest, legacy takes the form 
of “path determination”, implying that colonial choices determined post-colonial ones, or at least 
conditioned them, such that departure from the colonial pattern was, and perhaps remains, 
difficult and costly (Austin 2010).
Lessons I learnt about the humanities and what students should be taught
Although social thought and reflections about a wide range of interactions are a distinguishing 
feature of all human beings, my encounter with the humanities in their disciplinary form took 
place when I registered for my undergraduate degree at the American University in Cairo in 
February 1984. My studies continued when I pursued my post-graduate degree in sociology at 
the University of Dar es Salaam in late 1988. Further studies familiarised me with the disciplines. 
After two neophytes aborted my lecturing stay at the then Vista University in Soweto (now 
University of Johannesburg), I joined the department of sociology at the University of the North 
(now University of Limpopo) for seven and a half years. In 2004, after submitting my doctoral 
thesis entitled Prospects and problems of transforming universities in South Africa, with special 
reference to the right to be an African university, I bade farewell to academia. 
Given these experiences, I consider myself a student of the humanities and can point out 
that (1) it is accepted as a common cause that in terms of socio-historical and philosophical 
context, the humanities as disciplines were midwifed by the ‘Enlightenment’ and extended to the 
colonies through colonial imposition; (2) the effects of such superimposition included the 
exclusion of African epistemology and philosophy; and (3) thus to retain their undeserved 
dominance and elevated status will perpetuate both epistemic injustice and cognitive dissonance 
in the universities in Africa. Towards a quest for decolonisation of the humanities as an instance 
of democratisation, students of the humanities should be taught that:
The history of the development of the humanities disciplines in the West was 
characterised by lack of cognisance of multivariate contexts. As such, the idea held by 
Western ‘’iconic scholars’’ that Africa has no history and the view in Western 
philosophy that there is no such a thing as African philosophy are both a function of the 
inability of Western knowledge to engage and grapple with diversity and difference.
Central to diversity and difference is the appreciation that ‘’all knowledge is local" (Okere, Njoku 
and Devisch 2005) and universal knowledge can only exist in contradiction (Mafeje 2000). This is 
because production and generation of knowledge is highly ethnocentric, tribal and nativistic as it 
derives from particular environments and its standards are not permanent. 
 Standards for higher education are historical, temporary, contextual and tentative (Jansen 
1995; Lebakeng 2008) and the appeal to the maintenance of dubious “universal standards” is an 
impractical one as standards should rather be refined, recreated and improved. Standards are 
not universal, permanent, objective, neutral or invariant. As such, the notion of standards should 
be subjected to careful, specific and historically sensitive analysis.
Flowing from this, it is clear that Western knowledge is not universal and, therefore, cannot 
be (1) universalisable and (2) cannot possess the authority to authenticate or invalidate other 
knowledge forms despite some aspects of it, as with all knowledges, being transferrable.
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Pedagogically, it is a myopic conception that inevitably led to the endorsement of a single 
authoritative rationality and authoritative epistemology, further, to claims of knowledge that are 
supposedly true beyond time and space and unconditioned by particularity.
The starting point of the tradition of the politics of knowledge in political studies (Neave 
2006) and in the sociology of knowledge is that knowledge is situated and contextually bound. By 
this we should understand knowledge to derive value from its utility and not mere availability, 
thus dispensing with accusations of relativism. According to Apple (1993), knowledge selection, 
that is, who produces knowledge, what knowledge is produced and what knowledge is ‘’left out’’ 
are central questions of inquiry within the politics of knowledge. 
Thus, despite Western knowledge having pretensions of being nomothetic (using 
generalisation rather than specific properties in the same context) and privileging itself as the 
fiduciary custodian of all knowledge, it is increasingly becoming clear that knowledge is in 
essence highly idiographic, that is, it describes the study of a group, seen as an entity, with 
specific properties that set it apart from other groups. 
The Western nomothetic approach reached the African shores as scientism (the promotion 
of science as the best or only objective means by which society should determine normative and 
epistemological values). Methodologically, this can result in the exaggerated trust in the efficacy 
of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation. 
The imposition of Western science, and therefore, of the ‘’northbound gaze” manifested in 
what a sociology wit refers to as epistemicide – the destruction of knowledges of other peoples – 
has the material consequence of depriving the world of other intellectual and philosophical 
resources as it leads to homogenisation rather than nurturing polycentrism. It fails to ‘’let a 
thousand flowers bloom". 
This problem of not letting a thousand flowers bloom was heightened in the denial of the 
existence of African philosophy. However, it is noteworthy that the definition of philosophy is not a 
matter of ‘objective science' pure and simple. It is, on the contrary, a question of power relations 
as well (Ramose, 2004).
Science is as social and as subject to perversion as all other forms of knowledge in society. 
This being the case, there is no absolute way of separating science from the pervading 
ideologies of the day (Mafeje 1978).
While it is indisputable that European epistemology constitutes a pyramid of knowledge, it 
is equally true that indigenous African epistemology also independently and rightfully constitutes 
another and a different pyramid of knowledge (Ramose 1998). In this respect, the concept of 
knowledge democracy acknowledges this point and affirms the importance of multiple knowledge 
systems.
In terms of the relevance of this for African renaissance, it is noteworthy that economic 
models, such as scientific paradigms, predispose the actors towards certain patterns of 
behaviour and practices. Over time these become accepted as normal practices which 
everybody is expected to observe and follow. This is how theoretical orthodoxies are established 
(Mafeje 1998).
Western monological, non-reflexive and non-inclusive representations of Africa is a colonial 
experience that bequeathed a culture of epistemological silencing of African indigenous 
epistemology with its monochromatic logic of Western epistemology. It systematically devalued 
African indigenous knowledge systems by presenting African intellectual enterprises as illogical 
and sometimes primitive (Jimoh 2018).
A Western orientation and emphasis on the individual and de-emphasis of community and 
culture resulted in ideological dissonance and cognitive paralysis. Despite post-independence 
attempts to reverse this, vestiges of post-coloniality in contemporary education remain and 
perpetuate a myth of inferiority regarding indigenous knowledge and methods (Adebisi 2016).
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Claiming sovereignty of African scholarship 
Flowing from these lessons, we need to problematise the concept of ‘university’ since it appears 
to be anchored in a single ontology and informed by one epistemological version. There is a 
need to have universities in Africa as sites of multiple versions of how we know things. Towards 
this, it is important to recognise and acknowledge the way epistemicide works in current 
academic contexts (Bennett 2015) as it broadly continues to perpetuate Western organisational 
structures and institutional cultures under present determinate conditions. It is precisely this 
insightful understanding that has led Ndofirepi and Gwaravanda (2019) to argue that the 
continued domination of Eurocentric epistemology in universities in Africa, at the expense of 
African indigenous knowledge systems, is unjust.
Given that where there is clearly no justice in the educational sphere and with a good cause 
demonstrated for the need for epistemic justice, the ethical resistance to that condition requires a 
combative ontology. Little wonder that African scholarship has been purposefully aiming at 
correcting and reversing the lack of a cultivation of authenticity and specificity which, according 
to Mafeje (1985), is what enables an intellectual community to make a lasting contribution to 
knowledge and to put itself on the universal map as a growth centre.
In order to claim sovereignty over African scholarship, the starting point for the emerging 
generation of African scholars is to acknowledge that there is a range of scholars across the 
continent and in the diaspora, some departed and some still with us, who should be urgently 
crafted into the bio-politics of our knowledge. Our institutions of higher learning should ensure 
that students are much more strongly encouraged to interrogate these and other such works. 
Collectively, they have liberated knowledge from the positivistic and Cartesian model of scientific 
knowing, yet many institutions still cling to traditional pedagogical styles by teaching Western 
orthodoxies in the humanities. For them, in varied representations, indigenous African 
knowledge has been suggested as a replacement for colonial education. Among them we should 
include Claude Ake (Nigeria), Paul Hountondji (Benin), Dan Wadada Nabudere (Uganda), Archie 
Mafeje and Mogobe Ramose (South Africa) and Ngugi wa Thiongo, Peter Onyongo (Kenya). On 
the strength of their arguments and personal experience, Wa Thiong’o suggests that ‘a sound 
educational policy is one which enables students to study the culture and environment of their 
own society first, then in relation to the culture and environment of other societies’ (Wa Thiong’o 
1981).
The importance of these African works, among many others, lies in the teaching that, as 
Ramose (1991) points outs, the foundation of decolonisation is the recognition and indeed the 
acceptance of the principle that the consequences of colonial conquest need to be radically 
reversed. At the core of this should be the quest to reverse the epistemology of alterity and the 
need to resuscitate, harness and inscribe an African epistemology in the higher education 
system in Africa. This inevitably requires that the emerging African scholars should be 
conscientised to stop being intellectually xenophilic, especially in relation to its Europhilic strain 
(Lebakeng 2018). Failure to do this is to inadvertently internalise epistemicide and to take 
ownership of colonial ruins.
The task ahead is not mere epistemic posture, it is not indulgence in what Vest (2009) 
refers to as perverse and unnecessary dialogues. Essentially, it is a task aimed at repurposing, 
redefining, reimagining and redetermining these institutions, not only to reflect, but to serve 
Africa and humanity through an African philosophy and epistemology of education. This is 
important since the transformation of educational discourses in Africa requires philosophical 
frameworks that respect diversity, acknowledges lived experience and challenges the hegemony 
of Western forms of universal knowledge (Higgs 2011) and is hence subversive of the prevailing 
orthodoxies.
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In addition to our starting point, our propensity to maintain academic standards and to 
embrace dubious universal knowledge has to stop, as this has stalled the process of 
decolonising the post-colonial university in Africa. If we maintain standards, rather than recreate, 
refine and improve them, we will fail ‘’to reject social conventions’’ and this will hinder the 
possibility of social invention (Reinharz 1979). After all, decolonising the disciplines means 
interrogating the methods and approaches in the production of knowledge, dismantling the 
Western canon and contextualising it, retrieving the African archives and revisiting and using 
African icons in the democratisation project. In other words, decolonising the disciplines is an 
imperative for epistemic virtue and a moral claim and not a mere quest for parity. To seek parity is 
a sign of adoration of Western knowledge broadly and science in particular. 
Lastly, there is a need to address the paucity of authentic interlocutors by seriously and 
deliberately nurturing a core cadre of African scholars steeped in African sensibilities. After all, 
nobody can rely on the ‘’northbound gaze" (Ramose, 2000) and think and act outside historically 
determined circumstances and still hope to be a social signifier of any kind (Mafeje 2000). A new 
generation of African scholars must be rooted in African challenges, potentialities and prospects 
in order to derive meaning and relevance. This has prompted Mungwini (2017) to advocate for 
the dictum: Know Thyself. I submit that Western scholars, such as Emile Durkheim and Max 
Weber (pardon my bias for sociology) spoke distinctly to the European context of their time, as 
Michel Foucault did for his and that it is precisely this authenticity that guaranteed the efficacy 
and endurance of their discourses. They knew the nuances of their environment and anchored 
their representations and intellectual pronouncements in such.
Conclusion
The quest to decolonise knowledge and education in Africa places an imperative on the African 
scholars to become not only committed seekers of knowledge and truth but also activist 
intellectuals in the service of humanity (Mungwini 2020), hence the need for being engaged 
scholars. They can hardly avoid the connotation of "destruction" of existing structures, cultures, 
methodologies and theories. African humanities professionals should stop providing an alibi for 
the reduced funding of their disciplines. One way is to ensure that these disciplines are freed 
from the burden of epistemological captivity resulting from colonisation. As long as universities in 
Africa continue to rely on the epistemological paradigms of the West, they will continue to be 
impervious to the African realities and sensibilities. I submit that it is the flirtation of the 
humanities with Western science that has tempered their potency and all too often rendered 
them irrelevant and meaningless. In the humanities, we spent a great deal of time being seduced 
by vain debates as to whether these disciplines are a science or an art. 
There are still glaring shortcomings in inscribing the African epistemology and indigenous 
knowledge systems in education in Africa. First, there is a lack of a critical mass of intellectual 
cadre, as universities in Africa lack resources. Second, there is still intellectual over-reliance as 
sources of inspiration on the Western ‘’icons’’. These gaps have serious implications for the way 
forward, but cannot be impediments. We can only take pride in the growing number of 
publications that point to appreciation of the need to make the humanities relevant and grounded 
on the African continent.
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